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Behavioural	  Economics	  Perspectives:	  Implications	  for	  Policy	  and	  Financial	  Literacy*	  
	  
Morris	  Altman	  	  
Executive	  Summary	  This	  paper	  summarizes	  and	  highlights	  different	  approaches	  to	  behavioural	  economics.	  It	  includes	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  differences	  between	  the	  “old”	  behavioural	  economics	  school,	  led	  by	  scholars	  like	  Herbert	  Simon,	  and	  the	  “new”	  behavioural	  economics,	  which	  builds	  on	  the	  work	  of	  Daniel	  Kahneman	  and	  Amos	  Tversky	  and	  is	  best	  exemplified	  by	  Richard	  Thaler	  and	  Cass	  Sunstein’s	  recent	  book,	  Nudge.	  These	  important	  currents	  in	  behavioural	  economics	  are	  also	  contrasted	  with	  the	  conventional	  economic	  wisdom.	  The	  focus	  of	  this	  comparative	  analysis	  is	  to	  examine	  the	  implications	  of	  these	  different	  approaches	  in	  behavioural	  economics	  for	  financial	  literacy.	  	  The	  Simon	  approach	  argues	  that	  intelligent	  people	  can	  make	  decisions	  that	  appear	  irrational	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  conventional	  economic	  wisdom.	  However,	  these	  decisions	  are	  typically	  the	  right	  ones	  for	  the	  individuals	  making	  them	  and	  are	  often	  based	  on	  how	  the	  brain	  is	  wired	  as	  well	  as	  on	  the	  decision-­‐making	  environment	  these	  individuals	  face.	  Errors	  in	  decision	  making	  can	  be	  made	  if	  rationality	  is	  bounded—that	  is,	  if	  the	  quality	  of	  information	  used	  is	  poor	  or	  the	  information	  is	  framed	  in	  a	  misleading	  fashion.	  Also,	  the	  decision-­‐making	  environment	  might	  be	  such	  that	  individuals	  don’t	  have	  the	  right	  incentives	  to	  make	  ideal	  choices.	  Finally,	  individuals	  may	  not	  have	  the	  knowledge	  base	  to	  make	  ideal	  choices	  in	  finance-­‐related	  matters.	  Therefore,	  financial	  decision	  making	  can	  be	  improved	  by	  providing	  decision	  makers	  with	  better	  quality	  information	  presented	  in	  a	  non-­‐complex	  fashion,	  an	  institutional	  environment	  conducive	  to	  good	  decisions,	  and	  financial	  education	  that	  will	  facilitate	  making	  the	  best	  use	  of	  the	  information	  at	  hand	  within	  a	  specific	  decision-­‐making	  environment.	  	  The	  Kahneman-­‐Tversky	  approach	  is	  more	  focused	  on	  nudging	  or	  even	  legislating	  rules	  that	  drive	  choice	  in	  desired	  directions	  as	  defined	  by	  experts,	  as	  opposed	  to	  educating	  the	  decision	  maker.	  This	  perspective,	  often	  referred	  to	  as	  libertarian	  paternalism	  or	  light	  paternalism,	  holds	  that	  decisions	  may	  be	  inconsistent	  with	  conventional	  economic	  wisdom	  norms	  for	  rational	  decision-­‐making	  because	  they	  are	  based	  on	  how	  the	  brain	  is	  hard-­‐wired.	  Because	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  alter	  hard-­‐wired	  behaviour,	  decisions	  are	  often	  error-­‐prone,	  biased,	  and	  irrational.	  Financial	  education	  plays	  a	  much	  smaller	  role	  in	  improving	  choice	  behaviour	  in	  this	  approach	  than	  in	  Simon’s	  or	  the	  bounded	  rationality	  approach	  to	  behavioural	  economics.	  	  	  However,	  by	  recognizing	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  quality	  of	  information	  and	  how	  it	  is	  presented	  or	  framed	  for	  a	  decision	  maker,	  behavioural	  economics	  in	  general	  opens	  the	  door	  for	  public	  policy	  to	  improve	  the	  overall	  decision-­‐making	  environment.	  It	  helps	  us	  understand	  why	  it	  is	  critically	  important	  to	  improve	  financial	  literacy.	  This	  is	  particularly	  the	  case	  with	  the	  Simon	  approach	  and	  its	  focus	  on	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  decision-­‐making	  environment	  married	  with	  a	  strong	  dose	  of	  financial	  education.	  This	  approach	  holds	  that	  improved	  financial	  education	  allows	  decision	  makers	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  an	  improved	  incentive	  and	  information	  decision-­‐making	  environment.	  Little	  attention	  is	  paid	  to	  nudging	  or	  manipulating	  choice	  in	  a	  particular	  manner.	  Individual	  choice	  is	  largely	  respected,	  as	  in	  traditional	  economics,	  unless	  choices	  are	  deemed	  to	  cause	  social	  harm.	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  Introduction 
A standard definition of financial literacy is “having the knowledge, skills and confidence 
to make responsible financial decisions.” The institutional environment is also important to 
financial decision making and greatly affects choices, influencing the extent and quality of 
relevant information and incentives. Financial literacy is of increasing concern to government and 
other public policy makers. Surveys in OECD countries find that financial literacy is very low 
amongst individuals and households irrespective of income and education, especially amongst 
groups with lower income and less education. Even stock ownership and trading in financial 
assets do not appear to improve the level of financial literacy. Most people have difficulty 
answering questions about compound interest, inflation, or risk diversification, and difficulty 
understanding budgeting and saving programs and financial information in general. This appears 
to be the case in Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Korea, 
and the Netherlands (Munshaw 2008, OECD 2005, Yoong 2010). Serious gaps in financial 
literacy are of mounting concern, with the increasing number of financial products and services 
on the market, their increased complexity, and the escalating importance of financial decision-
making to individuals and society at large, especially as life expectancy is increasing. 
The topic of financial literacy raises the issue of the potential role that might be played by 
education, quality information, and incentives in improving decisions. It can be argued that with a 
less than ideal education, information set, and incentives, individuals cannot make the best 
decisions. By contributing to financial literacy, financial education contributes to more informed 
and effective decisions on financial matters such as contributions to pensions, use of credit cards, 
household budgeting, mortgages, and investing on the stock market. Improvements to relevant 
information, with a focus on quality (and truthfulness), make possible the effective use of 
financial education. Financial education and quality information go hand and hand, forming key 
ingredients to effective financial literacy.  
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This perspective on financial literacy, I would argue, runs contrary to the standard 
economic wisdom. It presumes that individuals have the physiological and psychological 
capabilities, and are in an informational, governance, and social environment, that will allow 
them to make optimal decisions. If the typical individual is so endowed, financial education can 
have little impact on improving choices. In effect, one might argue that in the conventional 
approach individuals either are assumed to be financially literate or that they make choices 
consistent with financial literacy, and that financial literacy can be improved only if individuals 
persistently make unwise choices that can be corrected by interventions in the decision-making 
process or in the decision-making environment.  
Research in behavioural economics suggests assumptions that are quite different. There 
are two key perspectives in behavioural economics that yield distinct implications for financial 
literacy and financial education (Altman 2009), both of which deny that individuals typically 
behave as rationally as assumed by conventional economics. Behavioural economics also 
questions the conventional assumption that the environment in which financial decisions are 
make is necessarily ideal.  
This paper discusses the implications of the two approaches of behavioural economics for 
possible improvements to financial literacy and, therefore, to financial decision making. What I 
refer to as the Kahneman-Tversky approach maintains that individuals make systematic errors 
and biases in decision making that are largely rooted in the hard-wiring of the brain. Errors and 
biases occur when individuals deviate from conventional (neoclassical) decision-making rules. 
Education can have little effect on such behaviour. This approach is much more supportive of 
government policy that nudges consumers into making decisions that some might argue are in the 
best interest of consumers. Experts are assumed to know better than individual decision makers 
what is in their best interest (Thaler and Sunstein 2003, 2008; see also Camerer, Issacharoff, 
Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, and Rabin 2003; de Meza, Irlenbusch, Reyniers 2008; Shefrin 2002; 
Thaler and Sunstein 2003, 2009; see Sugden 2008, 2009, for a critique of Thaler and Sunstein).  
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What I refer to as the Simon-March approach argues that individuals are physiologically 
incapable of behaving as prescribed and predicted by conventional economic wisdom. As a 
result, they develop heuristics, or experience-based decision-making shortcuts, to make choices 
that are rational even though often inconsistent with the conventional behavioural norms. It is 
also recognized that the typical choice environment is characterized by asymmetric information, 
incomplete information, and even false information and poor education. Both physiological and 
environmental constraints can, but need not, result in errors in decision making, such as relatively 
poor investment decisions. Because choice environments can be changed, this approach provides 
a much stronger rationale for enhancing the quality of financial decision making through 
improvements to financial education and the decision-making environment. This would include 
improved access to and improved availability of quality and pertinent information, appropriate 
decision-making rules and regulations, and appropriate financial education. On the whole, 
individual preferences, which are regarded as multi-faceted across decision makers, are respected 
and less attention is paid to nudging unless individual choices can be shown to cause social harm. 
This perspective is well reflected in the research of Shiller (2001, 2008, 2009, 2010), a leading 
behavioural finance scholar.  
These different approaches to financial decision-making are summarized in Table One. 
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Table One 
Comparing Different Approaches to Decision Making 
1. Conventional economic 
theory 
• Individuals make intelligent decisions, and they do not regret them. Their choices reveal 
informed and well-considered preferences. 
• An ideal decision-making environment is assumed. 
• Education and training (referred to as human capital formation) are regarded as important 
means of enhancing productivity. But no clear theoretical mechanism is specified linking 
improvements in the quantity and quality of education and improvements in decision 
making. 
• Human capital formation provides important theoretical space for explaining errors or less 
than ideal decisions, a space well-taken by behavioural economics.  
• Financial decision-making is assumed to be best-practice unless distorted by government 
interventions in the market and in decision making. 
2. Behavioural economics: 
Kahneman-Tversky, 
Errors and Biases 
Approach 
• Individuals tend to make irrational, error-prone decisions, which they eventually regret. 
• Errors and biases in decision making are wired into the brain architecture. 
• It is possible for the decision-making environment to be less than ideal. 
• Individuals often do not know what is in their own best interest. 
• The benchmark for rationality in decision making is based on conventional economics and 
focuses upon calculating behaviour. 
• Decision-making shortcuts are regarded as typically error-prone. 
• Individuals are easily fooled and deceived by how questions are framed and often reverse 
their preferred decisions with inconsequential changes in how questions or options are 
framed. 
• Education can sometimes improve decision making. 
• Government intervention in decision making is often thought to be the best-practice route to 
take for ideal choices to be made. 
• Financial decision-making will be biased and error-prone without government intervention 
in choice behaviour. 
• Some success predicted for improvements in the decision-making environment, less for the 
improvements to financial education. 




• Individuals are assumed to make rational decisions as a result of how the brain is wired and 
the decision-making environment. 
• Conventional benchmarks for rational or intelligent decisions are often rejected. 
• Decision-making shortcuts are rational more often than not, even when they contravene 
conventional economic benchmarks. 
• Individuals are not easily fooled, but they can be misled. 
• Individuals can make decision-making errors and these can lead to decisions that are subject 
to regret. 
• A major source of decision-making errors is a less than ideal institutional environment. 
• Education can have important effects on decision making. 
• Government plays an important role by establishing an ideal institutional environment and 
by providing the education required for ideal choices to be executed. 
• Government should not intervene in individual choices unless these choices can be shown 
to cause harm to others. 
• Financial decision-making can be improved by improving the decision-making environment 
and through improvement to financial education. 
• Government intervention in choice behaviour is not considered to be best-practice if 
individuals make decisions in an ideal decision-making environment and with appropriate 
levels of financial education. 
 
 
The Conventional Wisdom 
The standard set of assumptions of the conventional wisdom is well articulated by Herbert 
Simon (1987), who was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1978 for his contribution to the 
then nascent field of behavioural economics. He argues that the essence of the conventional 
economic decision-maker is embodied in the notion of Homo Economicus, which is characterized 
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by: (1) a stable set of preferences or wants or desires; (2) perfect knowledge of alternatives 
relevant to a choice problem; (3) the ability to forecast the expected consequences of particular 
choices in the present and into the future even when the future is highly uncertain; (4) the ability 
to make use of this knowledge to maximize personal economic well-being or happiness; (5) rapid 
updating of behaviour based on new information (Baysian updating); (6) consistency in the 
choices made by the individual; and (7) the insubstantial role of emotions and intuition in 
decision making (p. 221).  
An underlying assumption of these analytical assertions is that individuals have 
unbounded knowledge of relevant choice alternatives and unbounded computational capacities to 
determine outcomes of alternative choices. Individuals are assumed to make such choices 
independently of other individuals. They are unaffected by other people’s choices. It is also 
assumed that individuals have the capability and power to make the choices that they prefer to 
make. Other individuals do not, therefore, interfere with these choices. Moreover, it is assumed 
that rational decision-making takes place independently of emotional and intuitive behavioural 
drivers. Finally, it is assumed that rational individuals are narrowly selfish, most interested in 
maximizing their own material well-being. Deviations from such narrowly self-interested 
behaviour will not be welfare-maximizing (or maximizing happiness) and hence would be 
irrational. It is further assumed that individuals’ choices are sensitive to relative prices and 
income levels as well as to changes to these variables. The latter assumption refers to an 
underlying premise of the conventional wisdom, accepted by most behavioural economists, that 
incentives matter in decision making. 
Fast and Frugal Decision-Making (Smart Heuristics) 
With regards to the rationality or smartness of choice behaviour, James March (1978), a 
close associate of Simon and one of the pioneers of behavioural economics, argues that 
individuals are typically rational or intelligent when it comes to engaging in decision making 
even if their behaviour is at odds with conventional heuristics. What appears irrational from the 
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perspective of the conventional wisdom might be very rational and intelligent if one digs a bit 
below the surface (p. 589).  
Herbert Simon led the way in developing behavioural economics as an analytical 
perspective to better explain rational human choice behaviour or decision making that is 
consistent with real human beings facing real world environmental constraints. He develops the 
concepts of bounded rationality and satisficing (as opposed to maximizing) to better classify, 
describe, and analyse real-world choice behaviour. Keys points made by Simon (1987a) include 
the notion that one’s definition of rationality must be derived from an understanding of actual 
human behaviours and capabilities and environmental constraints and facilitators. Moreover, 
benchmarks for rational behaviours need be based upon an understanding of what human agents 
are capable of doing in the real world—a type of real-word modelling scenario to help identify 
best-practice decision-making rules to optimize human well-being or welfare.  
Building on the research of Simon and March, Gerd Gigerenzer (2007) developed the 
notion of fast and frugal heuristics to highlight how non-conventional decision-making, often 
driven by emotional and intuitive variables, results in effective and efficient decisions. These can 
include decisions made on financial markets or dealing with financial matters in a complex world 
where uncertainty is prevalent, information is imperfect and asymmetric, and information 
processing costly. This approach to an understanding of choice behaviour or decision making is 
also referred to as ecological rationality. One should note that the fast and frugal approach to 
decision making stands the errors-and-biases approach on its head since what is irrational from 
the latter perspective, where emotion and intuition yield poor decisions, can be most rational in 
the fast and frugal narrative. Emotive and intuitive factors are part of the complex decision-
making toolbox of the evolved human brain that helps generate relatively intelligent decisions in 
an efficient and effective fashion. 
This type of analytical paradigm sits well with and is informed by ongoing pioneering 
brain research, which finds that optimal decision-making cannot be largely or typically based on 
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rationality benchmarks that simply focus on calculating and logic-based behaviour, and where 
emotions and intuition are treated as obstacles to rational decision-making. Rather, emotion and 
intuition play a vital role in rational decision-making. Research has shown that individuals who 
suffer damage to the emotional part of the brain are no longer able to engage in rational decision-
making. Previously successful individuals become socially inept even at making and delivering 
such basic decisions as deciding what to buy and what to do during the day. 
 Antonio Damasio (2006) pioneered the research identifying the positive importance of 
emotions to rational decision-making, referred to as the somatic marker hypothesis. In this 
modelling framework, emotions allow people to act smart without having to think smart, at least 
in many significant instances.  
Nobel Laureate Vernon Smith (2003, 2005), who pioneered the development of 
experimental economics, also makes the case, based on his empirical research and that of his 
colleagues, that individuals typically don’t make decisions using prescribed conventional 
economic (neoclassical) decision-making rules. Smith argues that this is not a sign of irrationality 
in individual choice behaviour or of sub-optimal behaviour. Rather, non-conventional behaviour 
can even result in superior economic results.  
Simon refers to the proposition that rationality (smart behaviour) is contingent upon 
environmental conditions and physiological constraints and not upon exogenous and arbitrary 
benchmarks, such as in the case with conventional economics,.as process rationality. Smith, 
building on Gigerenzer’s most recent research as well as earlier work by Friedrich Hayek, refers 
to this type of context-dependent rationality as ecological rationality. Behaviour is ecologically 
rational if it is adapted to the structure of the environment and is best suited to the physiological 
make-up of the individual (such as computational limitations). For Smith and Hayek, individuals 
typically do the best they can do (satisficing), and tend to naturally evolve towards optimal (best-
practice) behaviour. However, even Smith argues, like Gigerenzer and Hayek before him, that 
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whether or not best-practice behaviour evolves can be contingent upon institutional parameters 
and learning.  
With regards to financial education, the concepts of procedural and ecological rationality 
open the doors to the possibility that education might affect and improve choice behaviour. At 
one extreme, the ecological (Smith-Hayek) perspective on behavioural economics suggests that 
decision makers and institutions naturally evolve towards best-practice decisions, albeit these 
decisions need not and typically will not be rational from a conventional economics 
(neoclassical) perspective. This extreme perspective, just like its conventional economics 
counterpart, would close the door to financial education as being of much value in generating 
better decisions from the individual decision-maker’s point of view and for society at large. 
In the behavioural economics paradigm pioneered by Simon, although individuals are 
typically rational, that is smart, when engaging in decision making, mistakes or errors can be 
made, which can be referred to as rational errors (Altman 2009). These might include making 
poor investment decisions that could have been avoided, like not investing adequately in 
pensions, or choosing a poor credit card option. From this perspective, informational, information 
processing, and institutional parameters play a key role in generating such errors. Better 
information, greater clarity in how information is presented and framed, and improved incentives, 
could fix such rational errors.  
But even when choice behaviour is at its smartest, outcomes from the decision-making 
process need not be optimal or rational from the perspective of society at large. Individual 
decision-makers in the financial sector, for example, might be satisficing and ecologically 
rational from their own perspective (maximizing their own wealth), but they might be 
bankrupting institutions (theirs and others’) in the process if the institutional parameters are not 
appropriate. Such behaviour can result in exceptional financial bubbles and busts that might 
cause great social harm, severely damaging the financial well-being of the many while benefiting 
the few. Such bubbles and busts can be a product of the rational and even optimal decisions of a 
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few key decision-makers. Another example of such privately rational but socially irrational 
decision-making is the problem a gambler creates by maximizing her or his happiness while 
having a disastrous effect on the family’s financing and well-being. In these instances, 
institutional change and the incentives embodied in institutional change might be of greater 
importance than education in affecting behaviour.  
Institutions Matter 
The Simon-March tradition of behavioural economics makes an important contribution by 
assigning a key role to institutional parameters in producing optimal decisions, unlike scholars 
following in the Kahneman-Tversky (errors and biases) perspective, who focus almost 
exclusively on psychological variables. From the Simon-March perspective, satisficing and non-
neoclassical rational behaviour (bounded rationality) takes place in the context of institutions 
within which individuals engage in decision-making and choice behaviour. Once the importance 
of institutions and related incentives (which should include social norms and rules and 
regulations) are placed front and centre as part of the analytical discourse, one can make more 
sense of socially irrational but individually rational (satisficing) behaviour, such as behaviour that 
maximizes the wealth of individuals while leading to severe recessions and large-scale 
bankruptcies of financial institutions.  
In fact, a pioneer of a highly libertarian approach to economics, Friedrich Hayek argues 
that appropriate institutions are a pre-requisite if rational individual choice in all its complexity 
and diversity is to yield optimal (welfare maximizing) or rational social outcomes. Hayek (1949) 
writes, in the tradition of Adam Smith, that individualism was “a system under which bad men 
can do least harm” (p. 11). This requires institutions that induce people to voluntarily contribute 
to the social good. Without such institutions socially beneficial outcomes need not be obtained. 
From this perspective, financial education can change behaviour. But the extent of this 
impact is mitigated by the institutional parameters in place at a given time. Improved decision-
making requires appropriate financial education plus appropriate institutions. One cannot be 
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expected to work without the other—they are two blades of the scissors required to produce ideal 
choices in financial matters from both an individual and social perspective. 
Errors and Biases and “Irrational” Heuristics 
Dominating behavioural economics at present is the perspective developed by Daniel 
Kahneman and Amos Tversky, that individual decision-making is characterized by persistent 
biases and errors in choice behaviour. Humans develop heuristics to engage in decision making. 
Because these differ from the neoclassically prescribed norms for choice behaviour, they are 
deemed to represent error-prone or biased ways of acting, and considered by many scholars to be 
irrational.  
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) stress the importance of neoclassical norms as the 
benchmarks for rational behaviour (p. 1130). What is critical to the popular and pervasive 
Kahneman and Tversky approach is the central role of emotion and intuition as the basis of 
choice irrationality in decision making, as opposed to the physiological and environmental 
variables stressed by the Simon-March approach to behavioural economics. Emotion and 
intuition can result in decision making that is short-sighted and subject to regret in the longer run; 
that is, in behaviour that is inconsistent with rationality, according to Tversky and Kahneman 
(1981). However, the emotional and intuitive side to the decision-making process might be 
subject to some control and re-education (p. 458).  
In a nutshell, Kahneman and Tversky’s key proposition, much of it articulated in prospect 
theory, relates to how emotive factors, rather than objective decision-making benchmarks, drive 
the decision-making process. The critical empirics that underlie prospect theory are: 
1. On average, individuals have a preference for outcomes that are certain, even if their 
monetary value is less than that of the uncertain outcome. For example, a person prefers a 
certain (100 per cent probability) $100 option over an option where there is an 80 per cent 
chance of obtaining $140 and a 20 per cent chance of ending up with nothing. The latter 
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yields an expected return of $112. Individuals are ”irrationally” willing to sacrifice $12 to 
gain a certain outcome. 
2. On average, individuals weight losses more than gains. For example, based upon 
Kahneman’s and Tversky’s research, a $100 loss would be given a weight of 2.5 and a 
$100 gain would be given a weight of 1. If one gains $100 and loses $100, one ends up 
with no net change in income or wealth. Objectively speaking, from a materialist 
(neoclassical) perspective, this type of event does not and should not affect ones well-
being. However, prospect theory suggests that an individual’s well-being will fall by quite 
a lot in this scenario as a result of the subjective (emotionally based) weights that 
individuals differentially attach to losses and gains. This causes individuals to be loss-
adverse—to feel particularly bad about losses. 
3. Individuals’ subjective well-being is affected by their relative standing and changes to 
their relative standing in terms of losses and gains. Absolute levels of wealth are less 
important than changes to wealth. For this reason, the reference point that the individual 
uses when making decisions is important, and these reference points are subjectively (thus 
not rationally) determined. 
4. The framing of options or prospect affects decision making. When	  events	  are	  framed	  positively,	  individuals	  tend	  to	  choose	  them	  over	  the	  same	  events	  framed	  negatively.	  This	  should	  not	  happen	  when	  the	  different	  frames	  have	  no	  substantive	  effect	  on	  events—packaging	  should	  not	  affect	  decision	  making.	  Since	  such	  frames	  do	  affect	  decision	  making,	  individuals	  are	  subject	  to	  perceptual	  or	  cognitive	  illusions.	  Related	  to	  this,	  individuals	  can	  be	  easily	  manipulated	  by	  frames.	  This	  is	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  framing	  effect.	  Such	  behaviour	  is	  considered	  to	  be	  irrational	  or	  biased.	  However,	  one	  should	  note	  that	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  that	  differential	  framing	  will	  affect	  choice	  behaviour	  when	  prospects	  or	  rates	  of	  return	  are	  substantively	  different.	  People	  can	  be	  fooled	  when	  the	  cost	  of	  being	  tricked	  is	  not	  all	  that	  great.	  In	  the	  same	  vein,	  Gigerenzer	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(2007)	  makes	  the	  point	  that	  in	  a	  world	  of	  imperfect	  information	  and	  uncertainty	  or	  of	  bounded	  rationality	  (the	  real	  world),	  frames	  signal	  information	  about	  the	  event.	  When	  an	  event	  is	  positively	  or	  negatively	  framed,	  individuals	  read	  between	  the	  lines,	  attempting	  to	  extract	  surplus	  information	  from	  the	  frames.	  A	  positive	  frame	  suggests	  a	  better	  choice	  than	  a	  negative	  frame.	  This	  is	  a	  judgment	  call	  that	  might	  prove	  to	  be	  incorrect.	  But	  it	  is	  a	  rational	  choice	  in	  a	  world	  of	  bounded	  rationality	  and	  uncertainty.	  However,	  this	  does	  not	  distract	  from	  the	  suggestion	  that	  frames	  can	  be	  manipulated	  such	  that	  smart	  people	  can	  end	  up	  making	  rational	  errors	  in	  their	  decisions,	  yielding	  choices	  that	  they	  might	  not	  have	  made	  had	  there	  been	  better	  cognitive	  frames	  in	  place	  (pp.	  99-­‐100). 
As part of the Kahneman-Tversky perspective, the following are identified as key 
cognitive biases (there are said to be many others) in decision making: 
1. Overconfidence: Individuals overestimate their decision-making capabilities. As a 
result, individuals engage in risky behavior in activities beyond their objective 
capacity to succeed. 
2. Herding: The tendency of individuals to mimic the behaviour of others can result in 
cascades of particular choices. Herd behaviour occurs even when other individuals’ 
behaviours are error-prone in the long run. 
3. Loss aversion (related to prospect theory). 
4. Status quo bias and the endowment effect: Individuals show a preference for the status 
quo even when it does not yield higher levels of material welfare. One example would 
be an individual valuing an asset by more than its purchase price even though its 
market value is not increasing. Possession in itself increases the value of the item 
possessed in the eyes of the individual endowed with this asset. 
5. Framing effect (related to prospect theory). 
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6. Anchoring: Individuals tend to anchor their choices to reference points that are not 
objectively relevant to the decision at hand. This relates to what is referred to as the 
recognition heuristic (see below). 
One important implication of the Kahneman and Tversky perspective to behavioural 
economics is that because individual decision-making tends to be irrational, error-prone or biased 
for emotive reasons—and, related to this, because of the role heuristics play in decision making 
(which can involve intuition)—external intervention can be justified in choice behaviour. Experts 
(or bureaucrats informed by experts), coming from a rational benchmark, can affect the decision 
outcomes or choices of individuals by regulating choice behaviour or by encouraging particular 
choices based upon what is taken by an expert to be optimal choices, which the expert believes to 
be in the best interest of the individual. Such intervention could take place even if an individual’s 
choices are not encumbered by negative externalities and, therefore, cause no harm to others.  
This line of thinking is expressed quite eloquently by Thaler and Sunstein (2008): 
“Individuals make pretty bad decisions in many cases because they do not pay full attention in 
their decision making (they make intuitive choices based on heuristics), they don’t have self-
control, they are lacking in full information, and they suffer from limited cognitive abilities.” (p. 
6) As a consequence, individuals should be nudged towards rational choices. People who oppose 
choice architecture, they argue, do so because they make the false assumption that “almost all 
people, almost all of the time, make choices that are in their best interest or at the very least are 
better than the choices that would be made by someone else. We claim that this assumption is 
false. In fact, we do not think that anyone believes this on reflection.” ( p. 11). This implies that 
education cannot be expected, with any degree of confidence, to do the trick in affecting choice 
behaviour. Choice architecture is a way of framing choice options so that people can be nudged 
or manipulated into making the “correct” or rational choices.  
Financial Education and Literacy and the Different Faces of Behavioural Economics 
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The different approaches to economics imply various attitudes toward the potential for 
education and learning to affect choice behaviour. Conventional economics suggests that 
financial education can do little substantively, since individuals are behaving neoclassicially, 
making choices consistent with neoclassical behaviour, or are quickly forced into behaving 
neoclassically by market forces, Behavioural economics, on the other hand, has provided us with 
an abundance of evidence that individuals do not behave neoclassically (Altman 2006; Akerlof 
and Shiller 2009; Gigerenzer 2007; de Meza, Irlenbusch, Reyniers 2008; Roubini and Mihm 
2010; Kahneman 2003; Shefrin 2002; Shiller 2001; Wärneryd 2001). Whether that behaviour is 
rational, however, depends on what approach to behavioural economics one subscribes to. 
Therefore, these differing approaches proffer different prescriptions as to what can or should be 
done about current decision-making processes or outcomes that do not accord with the 
conventional economic or neoclassical benchmarks for what are considered rational behaviours 
and rational choices. Just as with conventional economics, what determines how the different 
strands of behavioural economics regard the potential impact of education on financial decision-
making very much hinges upon which benchmark is used for determining rational behaviour and 
what are thought to be the critical determinants of individuals deviating from the acceptable 
rationality (smart decision-making or choice) benchmarks. 
In other words, from the perspective of the conventional wisdom, education can do little 
to influence finance-related decision-making since it is assumed that individuals behave 
according to the dictums of optimal neoclassical rational behaviour or generate choice outcomes 
consistent with neoclassical rationality benchmarks. The mainstream of behavioural economics, 
dominated by the Kahneman-Tversky perspective on human choice behaviour, regards the 
average individual’s decision making to be dominated by persistent errors and biases and 
irrational behaviour using conventional economic or neoclassical benchmarks for rational 
behaviour. Moreover, the average individual is thought to be subject to persistent cognitive 
illusions and therefore easily manipulated by the framing of options or prospects. This opens the 
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doors to intervention in the realm of decision making and choice in many dimensions, including 
educating people to behave more rationally. Since emotion and intuition are regarded as key 
culprits in driving irrational decision-making and, therefore, irrational choice, educating people to 
better control their emotive side would be a critical function of financial education from the 
Kahneman-Tversky perspective in behavioural economics.  
Simon’s perspective on behavioural economics agrees with the Kahneman-Tversky 
worldview, that individuals do not behave neoclassically. But it disagrees in that it does not 
necessarily find decision making and resulting choices to be irrational. Rather, more often than 
not, choice behaviour is considered to be ecologically rational or rational from a process 
perspective. Neoclassical norms are not used as benchmarks for how rational people should 
behave. Moreover, emotion and intuition are viewed as often playing an important positive role in 
real world decision-making. But this does not imply that individuals cannot make errors in 
decision making (rational errors) or that rational individual choices cannot generate socially 
irrational results. Errors in decision making can be based, for example, on imperfect and 
misleading information, poor incentives, and the inability of individuals to make their preferred 
choices.  
Financial education can improve decision making (result in fewer errors) by providing 
individuals with better information and understandings of decision problems and the means to be 
better able to process this information. Moreover, in the Simon-March worldview, such financial 
education would have most impact if it were structured to minimize processing time and designed 
to minimize the complexity of information. This recognizes the brain as a scarce resource and the 
human proclivity to use fast and frugal heuristics (Gigerenzer) in decision making (including 
information processing). Finally, in the Simon-March approach, institutions play a key role in 
determining the choices people make. This approach is one which would be much more 
libertarian in its approach to financial decision-making. It would be much less concerned with 
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outcomes than with providing people with the means to make decisions and choices that they 
prefer to make, unless such privately maximizing decisions causes social harm. 
Shiller (2008) provides an example of the Simon-March approach when making the case 
that one cause for bad investment decisions is bad information and bad arguments. He favours the 
provision of higher quality information and the better dissemination of such information as one 
very important mechanism with which to improve financial decision-making. And, he argues, 
government should subsidize this since it would be socially beneficial (Shiller 2008, 2009). 
Shiller writes: Financial	  advice	  is	  in	  some	  respects	  like	  medical	  advice:	  we	  need	  both	  on	  an	  ongoing	  basis,	  and	  failure	  to	  obtain	  either	  can	  impose	  costs	  on	  society	  when	  our	  health—physical	  or	  financial—suffers.	  There’s	  a	  strong	  case	  to	  be	  made	  that	  the	  government	  should	  subsidize	  comprehensive	  financial	  advice	  …	  to	  help	  prevent	  bubbly	  thinking	  and	  financial	  overextension.	  	   Getting	  into	  the	  specifics	  of	  quality	  information,	  Shiller	  (2010)	  argues	  for	  regulated	  labelling	  for	  financial	  products	  analogous	  to	  required	  nutritional	  labelling	  for	  food	  products	  as	  a	  means	  to	  improve	  financial	  decision-­‐making.	  He	  argues	  that	  labels	  should	  be	  designed	  to	  provide	  consumers	  with	  basic	  information	  in	  a	  relatively	  easy	  to	  read	  and	  understand	  format,	  one	  that	  does	  not	  send	  false	  signals	  to	  potential	  buyers	  of	  financial	  products.	  Labels	  should	  include	  understandable	  information	  on	  risk	  and	  returns.	  Shiller	  (2010)	  maintains:	  Including	  such	  information	  on	  financial	  products	  would	  give	  an	  enormous	  boost	  to	  the	  efficiency	  and	  efficacy	  of	  our	  financial	  products	  in	  serving	  customers’	  needs.	  The	  only	  reason	  that	  such	  labeling	  has	  not	  yet	  been	  required	  is	  the	  same	  reason	  that	  nutritional	  labels	  were	  not	  required	  long	  ago	  on	  foods.	  Public	  outcry	  at	  a	  time	  of	  scandal	  forced	  progressive	  change	  then;	  we	  should	  hope	  that	  it	  does	  so	  now. 
Linkages Between Financial Issues, Financial Education, and Financial Literacy 
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The approaches to financial education and financial literacy that flow from the differing 
methodological perspectives within behavioural economics can be illustrated and highlighted by 
looking at how these different methodological narratives would engage financial education to 
tackle key areas of consumer decision-making on financial matters. Arguably, of particular 
importance to many is the underinvestment in pensions and business-cycle behaviour with 
regards to investments in the stock market. Also of importance is the trust heuristic, a fast and 
frugal heuristic often employed in financial decision-making. 
Pensions and Saving 
It is well documented that, on average, individuals underinvest in savings for retirement 
(Thaler and Sunstein 2008; OECD 2005). Of critical importance in much of the behavioural 
literature, when people are relatively young they make consumption choices that result in 
pensions too low to meet their income needs after retirement. This is often explained as a product 
of a lack of self-control or lack of foresight; little attention is paid to the possibility that relatively 
low levels of savings are driven by inadequate levels of income. Later in life, many people would 
like to save more, but they find it much too late to compensate for inadequate savings earlier and 
they regret the savings-related decisions they made when they were young. This contravenes the 
conventional economic wisdom that predicts that rational decision-makers will adequately save 
for their retirement, such as is reflected in the life-cycle hypothesis, presently a dominant 
economics view of real-world saving behaviour. 
Many behavioural economists have argued that savings behaviour is largely determined 
by how saving options are framed to the potential saver. It is also well documented that if the 
default option for a savings plan is that one is enrolled automatically, the vast majority of 
employees enroll, and will therefore not choose to fill out the forms allowing them to opt out. If 
the default option is not to participate in a savings plan, the vast majority will not, and will 
therefore not choose to fill out the form to opt in (Thaler and Sunstein 2003; Benartzi and Thaler 
2007). This suggests that individuals are easily and willingly manipulated or nudged into savings 
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behaviour that they will probably prefer to have later on in life. From the perspective of the 
Kahneman-Tversky approach to behavioural economics, changing the frame or default of a 
pension option is the ideal method of dealing with the irrational decision-making behaviour of the 
average individual. Financial education per se is not critically important in this instance in 
changing choice behaviour. What counts is the default option. 
From the Simon-March bounded rationality perspective, the manner in which an option is 
framed provides rational individuals, in an uncertain world with imperfect information, with 
implicit data or signals about options. Changing the saving default option to saving signals that 
participating in a particular savings plan is the right and safe thing to do. It is therefore a moral 
imperative that if opting in is the default option, the state ensures that employees aren’t 
unwittingly opting into high-risk savings plans. It is also important that employees are provided 
with reasonable opting-out mechanisms from possibly high-risk pension plans.  
It also critical to note that changing the default option has the most success when 
employers or governments have provided funds, in some proportion, to match employee 
contributions. Changing the default, in itself, has often not been sufficient to flip employee 
decision-making in a dramatic manner. Therefore, it appears that incentives also play a critical 
role in changing savings behaviour. The relative role played by changing the default option 
remains a subject for future research. 
Financial education can play a role in changing savings behaviour from the perspective of 
bounded rationality, but not by changing the behavioural traits of decision makers. Rather, by 
providing employees with improved information, it is possible that some employees will choose 
to invest more towards their retirement. Also, providing information on pension plan options can 
allow employees to better understand the risks involved in particular pension plans. But the 
evidence suggests that, on average, changing the default option, along with changing the 
economic incentives, is the most effective mechanism of changing savings behaviour. 
An important study on financial literacy commissioned by the OECD (OECD 2005) 
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found that financial education can, indeed, make a substantive difference to savings behaviour (p. 
57). This is most often the case when employers and financial advisors provide financial 
information that employees trust and present it in a manner that is easily understood. However, 
such advice is often provided by individuals who have a vested interest in encouraging 
employees to invest in particular pension plans. As a result, the advice is biased towards the 
advisors’ preferred plans.  
According to this same study, “Many consumers accept without question what their 
financial advisor recommends.” (p. 46) This suggests that in a world of bounded rationality and, 
more specifically, when given highly complex information, combined with limited knowledge, 
limited time to assess and analyze that information, and uncertainty, individuals often fall back 
on heuristics when making financial decisions when there are faced with changes in defaults for 
saving and, more specifically, for pension options. For this reason, a critical aspect of financial 
education is for there to be third parties who can attest to the accuracy and integrity of the 
financial information provided and who can be involved in determining which pension options 
are set as the default. This is especially important if the default option, in an unregulated market, 
is for high-return, high-risk pension fund options, where the trust heuristic can result in losses 
that employees do not expect.  
As a contemporary footnote to this discussion of investments in pension-fund-related 
financial assets, in the recent past leading financial rated agencies provided AAA credit ratings to 
very high-risk bundled assets, such as the Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs) that contained 
both safe and highly risky assets. This falsely signaled to consumers that these assets were judged 
to be safe by internationally renowned and trusted private sector rating agencies. In such a case, 
financial education and improved financial literacy could not have protected consumers or 
provided them with the means to make improved financial decisions when faced with misleading 
information that they trusted to be accurate. For rational decision-makers to make optimal 
decisions, the information at hand must also be as correct as possible (Lewis 2010; Posner 2009; 
	   22	  
Roubini and Mihm 2010). 
Investing in Financial Assets 
Investment in financial assets over the business cycle and across significant booms and 
busts provides another excellent platform from which to assess how the different behavioural 
economics narratives speak to the ability of financial education to affect decision-making. 
Investment in financial assets highlights behaviours that are inconsistent with conventional 
benchmarks for rational decision-making. These aberrant behaviours include greed, 
overconfidence, herding, and passive trading, or the absence of true Bayesian updating (constant 
updating of decision making based on new information). The Kahneman and Tversky approach 
to behavioural economics seeks to discover means to overcome such behaviours. However, 
research into investor behaviour suggests that individuals who do not behave neoclassically are 
financially better off on average than those who perform based on conventional neoclassical 
prescriptions. This being said, it is important to determine the role financial education can play in 
improving financial decision-making by the average individual and, perhaps more poignantly, 
reducing the probability that the average individual will make disastrous investment decisions.  
Karl-Erik Wärneryd (2001) finds that non-rational investors, from a neoclassical 
perspective, are typically more successful than relatively sophisticated (more neoclassically 
oriented) investors (p. 6). These would be passive or noise traders, who are often held responsible 
for fluctuations in financial markers and for crashes. They are interested in the long run and are 
not neoclassically calculating, but do relatively well in the long run. 
Gerd Gigerenzer (2007) provides a concrete example of such behaviour in his analysis of 
the investment behavior of Harry Markowitz, 1990 Nobel Prize Laureate in economics (pp. 26-
28). Markowitz, was awarded the Nobel Prize for his research on optimal asset allocation. He 
argues that there is an algorithm to compute an asset portfolio that maximizes returns while 
minimizing risk. However, when putting together his own investment package, Markowitz uses 
what Gigerenzer refers to as the 1/N rule, which tells us to spread our money equally across each 
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of the designated N funds. This is how most ordinary folk-type investors actually behave. These 
are the passive investors mentioned by Wärneryd. The 1/N heuristic actually outperforms the 
portfolios constructed using the optimal algorithms derived from economic theory. The complex 
algorithms outperform the 1/N asset allocation only over very long spans of time—50 assets 
distributed by the complex theory-based algorithm requires 500 years to outperform the 1/N rule 
asset distribution, so not in our or many lifetimes. As well, this and other heuristic-based 
investment portfolios typically outperform portfolios designed by major investment houses and 
fund managers. 
The 1/N heuristic is a fast and frugal shortcut that jibes with the computational capacities 
of the human brain working within the realm of imperfect, asymmetric, and uncertain 
information. It also overrides short-run emotional considerations that drive an individual’s 
investment decisions. This heuristic is not only a descriptor of individual behaviour; for some 
behavioural economists and economic psychologists it is also an optimal heuristic for investor 
behaviour if one isn’t privy to insider information. One lesson from this type of analysis is that, 
for most people, passive investing strategies in a relatively diversified asset portfolio (such as is 
given by the 1/N rule) is optimal. Moreover, active investing (the neoclassical heuristic) is sub-
optimal. Investing in a mutual fund, where trading is not aggressive, is a proxy to investing by 
the1/N rule.  
These findings sit quite nicely with the bounded rationality–satisficing approach to 
behavioural economics. In this instance financial education can play an important role in 
informing individuals about actual returns from different types of investment strategies. It can 
also provide information on the advantage of holding on to a diversified asset portfolio over the 
long term as asset prices, on average, tend to revert to the mean (the mean reversion hypothesis). 
One cannot expect the typical individual to have this information easily at hand in an easily 
comprehensible format.  
An important question becomes who is best positioned to objectively provide such 
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information. One should not expect private investment houses or banks to provide neutral 
information and education in this area if higher profits can be made attracting investment into 
funds with active fund managers. As previously discussed, Shiller (2008, 2009, 2010) makes the 
case for legislating and subsidizing the provision of such information. 
Bubbles and Busts: Animal Spirits and Decision-Making 
Many behavioural economists have tied both bubbles and busts to emotionally driven 
(and therefore irrational or biased) heuristics motivating decision-making. This is exemplified in 
the most recent crash in financial markets. Greed, animal spirits (decision-making driven by 
psychological factors), irrational exuberance (pro-active investment behaviour not based on 
economic fundamentals), and overconfidence are considered to be the key culprits. (See, for 
example, Akerlof and Shiller 2009; Shefrin 2002.) Behavioural economists coming from the 
Kahneman-Tversky perspective might argue that efforts to mitigate these behavioural traits, 
through education for example, could reduce the severity of severe booms and busts in average 
financial asset prices. Furthermore, individuals might be expected to learn from past experience 
so as not to repeat past behaviour that results in severe economic loses. Thaler, a key proponent 
of the Kahneman-Tversky approach, is not convinced of the efficacy of financial education in this 
domain, as many of these behaviours are hard-wired. For this reason he is a strong proponent of 
nudging as a means of changing the way individuals make choices (Palmer 2008; Thaler and 
Sunstein 2008). 
From the Simon-March approach as well, to the extent that greed, animal spirits, and 
exuberance are part and parcel of the evolved human animal, education would do little to modify 
decision making that is predicated upon these human characteristics. But such behaviours would 
not necessarily be deemed irrational. For example, individuals who wish to improve their 
material well-being can be expected to invest in financial assets that are rising in value and divest 
financial assets whose value is falling. This can be referred to as greed, but it is not at all clear 
that this behaviour is irrational, Wanting more rather than less, such as wanting higher instead of 
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lower returns from financial assets, would seem to be consistent with rational or intelligent 
behaviour.  
How one decides to invest is often determined by animal spirits. Keynes (1936) refers to 
animal spirits as behavior that is motivated by emotive factors, as opposed to calculating or hard-
core economic rationality demanded by conventional economics. He speculates : 
Most, probably, of our decisions to do something positive, the full consequences of which 
will be drawn out over many days to come, can only be taken as the result of animal 
spirits – a spontaneous urge to action rather than inaction, and not as the outcome of a 
weighted average of quantitative benefits multiplied by quantitative probabilities (pp. 
161-162).  
But animal spirits, although not calculating behaviour, is intuitive, based on a sense of 
what one expects to occur in the near future. It is a heuristic based on one’s expectations in a 
world of uncertainty. Although not consistent with calculating behaviour, it is consistent with 
bounded rationality and satisficing. Nevertheless, animal spirits can serve to generate significant 
deviations from economic fundamentals. 
Take the case when animal spirits are motivated by how other people behave or how one 
expects other people to behave on the market. In a world of uncertainty investors use proxies 
such as rumours or insights from experts to build their expectations. In this fashion, individuals 
follow the leader in their investment behaviour once these leaders are identified. This is an 
example of the recognition heuristic Gigerenzer identified. Thus, individuals make choices based 
on what appears to be quality information or signals in the immediate absence of anything better. 
This particular type of recognition heuristic is referred to as herding. Herding can generate 
cascades in financial asset prices that deviate quite significantly from the economic fundamentals 
of the economic assets represented by financial paper (Shiller 2001). Cascades can contribute to 
significant financial bubbles and busts in asset pricing. Is the application of this herding heuristic 
an example of irrational animal spirits or of irrational exuberance?  
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 According to the Kahneman-Tversky perspective, this type of decision making is an 
example of irrationality because it runs contrary to behavioural norms of the conventional 
neoclassical wisdom. The solution here might be to convince people that herding behaviour is not 
the best strategy, and neither is the recognition heuristic or being influenced by rumours. But it is 
unlikely that people can be convinced of this when they operate in a world of bounded rationality. 
Such behaviour is, as mentioned above, individually rational, although it does, invariably in the 
long run, result in financial booms and busts. To put this another way, should people who want to 
make more money on their investments not invest in assets that are increasing in value, because 
they know that one day prices might fall? Would the counterfactual to this dilemma be that they 
should not invest in financial assets, including real estate or housing, when pricing are rising? 
Should this rule of thumb apply to financial advisors as well? Would this be rational? And is this 
what one would want financial education to propagate?  
At this point, it is important to note that during financial asset price cascades individuals 
do not hold on to assets whose prices are falling relative to their fundamental values, nor do they 
dump assets whose prices are rising relative to their fundamental values. In other words, 
individuals do not behave as predicted by Kahneman-Tversky. Contrary to Kahneman-Tversky, 
many people are risk-adverse in losses (they dump bad assets) and risk-seeking in gains (they 
hold on to relatively high priced assets for too long) when there is a credible leader or rumour to 
justify such behaviour. In fact, one cause for booms and busts is animal spirits as driven by 
herding behaviour, such that bad assets are dumped quickly and assets with increasing prices are 
held for too long in the sense that they are kept at least until a crash seems imminent—a situation 
that no one can in fact predict with any calculable and precise probability.  
Richard Posner (2009), one the key proponents of the conventional economic wisdom but 
highly critical of economic theory’s shortcomings with respect to the 2008-2009 economic crisis, 
argues that institutional failures were largely to blame for the financial meltdown, as opposed to 
the irrationality of decision maker—even though decision makers were acting contrary to 
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neoclassical first principles of decision making (p. 76). Thus, for example, greed, irrational 
optimism, intellectual deficiencies, or mistakes and errors in decision making are not the main 
causal culprits in economic collapse. Posner also argues that emotive variables, so stringently 
critiqued by the Kahneman-Tversky perspective as well as by the conventional neoclassical 
outlook, should not be regarded as indicative of irrational drivers in the decision-making process. 
Posner (2009) maintains that emotions represent telescoping thinking that is often “superior to 
conscious analytic procedures.” He also argues that buying at the peak and not selling at the 
trough of a cycle is not irrational since no one knows when the peak or tough occur in a world of 
uncertainty, and decision-making is like firing a shot in the dark. With uncertainty there is no 
strict mathematical basis for decision making. We base actions on our intuition of what we think 
makes the most sense. This behaviour is neither irrational nor subject to change by education if it 
is based on what decision makers perceive to be solid information (pp. 82-85).  
Posner (2009) argues that herding behaviour is also quite rational since in a world of 
imperfect information someone else might know something that you do not. Following a 
supposedly informed individual might be in your best interest, and not following might turn out 
not to be in your best interest (p. 84). Here again, from Posner’s perspective, one cannot educate 
decision makers not to herd because herding is rational in a world of uncertainty, although 
herding invariably results in busts. Rational decision-makers can’t predict when bubbles will 
burst or when there will be a recovery in the real world of bounded rationality. So, in Simon’s 
methodological terminology, rational agents satisfice, they ride the tide and hope for the best 
while searching for easily identifiable and relatively trustworthy signals when engaging in 
financial decision-making. 
Posner accepts that smart people can make errors when they make decisions. But these are 
errors that smart people can make and not the product of Kahneman-Tversky-type irrationalities. 
For Posner, institutional failure was the key reason that non-conventional (but smart) behavioural 
heuristics did not work in 2008-2009. Whether or not good or bad institutions are in place 
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depends on public policy. This analysis fits into the Simon-March approach to behavioural 
economics that emphasizes rational behaviour in a world of bounded rationality and the 
importance of institutional parameters affecting decision making. Therefore, many significant but 
problematic financial choices from a social perspective are better addressed through institutional 
change than through financial education. 
Posner’s point of focus is the incentive environment created for different levels for 
decision makers within financial institutions as well as consumers prior to the 2008-2009 
financial crisis. This incentive environment minimized the risk or reduced the cost to rational 
individuals and large financial corporations of knowingly engaging in overly risky behaviour. 
Lewis (2010) makes a similar argument, as do Roubini and Mihm (2010). They argue that 
executive compensation was very generous and truncated on the downside, so that if you made 
decisions that yielded high profits in the short run but caused harm in the long run, you were 
protected by your compensation package. Executives were given incentives to make decisions 
that could have disastrous consequences for their company, their employees and society at large, 
because they were insulated from their own risky decision-making. This is a classic moral hazard 
environment that was created by financial corporations and encouraged by government. This 
moral hazard environment extended to lower-level decision-makers, such as investment brokers 
and advisors, who were also protected from the costs of poor decisions by their compensation 
packages. 
Rational consumers in the United States were also induced into making investments in 
housing based on low interest rates, such that individuals with little or no collateral were willing 
to take out mortgages in the belief that interest rates would remain low. Neither buyers nor sellers 
envisioned significant risks from the moral hazard institutional environment. According to 
Posner, the downside of the housing market was truncated, “making [the buyer’s and seller’s] 
‘reckless’ behavior not only rational but also consistent with [their] being well informed about 
the risks.” (p, 104). 
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From this perspective, a misguided institutional environment is a more likely explanation 
of poor decision-making both from an individual and social perspective than is simple 
irrationality or even poor information (for example, Posner, p. 111). In this case, financial 
education cannot be expected to have much effect. You cannot educate people to behave 
differently if they are behaving as sensible individuals can be expected to behave in a world of 
bounded rationality. For example, you cannot teach people not to ride the tide, follow the herd, 
use their intuition, and take advantage of good deals when these are the best available options. 
Only after the fact can some of these heuristics be said to result in bad decisions. 
Informational Problems and Errors in Decision Making 
 Even with correct incentives, informational problems can cause rational decision-makers 
to execute decisions that they would not otherwise engage in. Shiller (2008, 2009, 2010) 
emphasizes the significance of the informational environment to financial decision-making. 
Improvements to the quality of information, to access, and to understanding through education 
can be expected to at least mitigate many of the poor financial decisions made in the past. The 
role played by misleading information in decision making, all other things remaining the same, is 
particularly important.  
For example, when assets receive a triple-A rating from respected rating agencies, 
consumers tend to trust this information and purchase what appears to be high-yielding, relatively 
low-risk assets. This is exactly what was happening in the global financial market before the 
2008-2009 financial crisis. Financial assets that were a mix of high-grade and low-grade assets (a 
mix referred to as toxic assets) were given a clean bill of health. Consumers who used asset 
ratings as one input into the investment decision-making process may have been misled into 
making high risk investments that they would not have made had more accurate ratings been 
provided by trusted rating agencies. Moreover, had consumers purchased fewer financial assets in 
a different information environment, the market for these assets would have been smaller, 
altering the dynamics of global financial asset markets.  
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One problem inherent in the rating of financial assets is that the rating agencies are private 
and self-regulating institutions in a highly uncompetitive market (at best an oligopolistic market). 
There exists a conflict of interest between the rating agencies and the corporations whose 
financial products are being rated. It is possible that decision making could be been improved 
with better, more accurate information and an improved understanding of the information at 
hand. But, as Shiller (2008, 2010) points out, past experience and the incentive environment 
suggest that such information is best provided within a regulatory framework, as is the case with 
food labels. 
A similar type of scenario with regards to this type of information can be found in the 
mortgage market. It is not clear that purchasers of mortgages were made aware of the fine print 
relating to the structure of interest rates over the term of the mortgage in the American market. 
Many individuals do not read the fine print of financial documents or understand the complex 
language of the documents. Another common example of this is credit card arrangements, where 
interest rates can increase dramatically within a relatively short period after an individual signs 
up. Yet another example involving credit cards is the defaults established for increasing the 
maximum allowable expenditure. If the default is to increase the credit limit on demand, and 
consumers can be aware of this only after reading the details in fine print, they might be basing 
financial decisions on inadequate (imperfect) information.  
The clear implication of these types of examples is that rational individuals can make 
choices that they will regret when faced with inadequate or false information. Improved financial 
decision-making can be achieved, therefore, when an impartial body, a government, for example, 
assures that consumers are provided with the information they require in a manner they can 
comprehend, together with the tools to better understand the financial information they are 
provided with. Under such a scenario, improved information yields improved financial literacy. 
And, it should be noted, providing quality assurance for the information and even for the defaults 
made available to consumers is a subset of consumer protection. 
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The Trust Heuristic 
The trust heuristic is another non-conventional tool used by decision makers that is 
subject to critique by both the conventional and Kahneman-Tversky type perspectives as a form 
of irrational behaviour. As with other fast and frugal heuristics, emotional and intuitive drivers 
affect the trust heuristic. But trust has a long tradition of being used by decision makers. In the 
absence of legal guarantees, it provides a second-best substitute. In a world of legal guarantees 
with bounded rationality, the trust heuristic saves on transaction costs by allowing for speedy, 
effective, and efficient decisions (Greif 1989; Kohn 2008; Landa 1994, 2008).  
Trust is the expectation that the other party to a transaction will deliver on promises made. 
This might be because the other party incorporate one’s interests into her own. Also of 
importance is a sense that reneging on a transaction would lead to economic consequences for the 
other party, either because of reputational harm or social or legal repercussions. But moral 
sentiments appear to be a key ingredient to trust relationships, with reputational, social, and legal 
variables adding strength to the mortar. Marek Kohn (2008) makes the following point about 
trust:  
…cooperation may be initiated and sustained without trust. But once trust becomes 
possible it sustains interactions that would otherwise collapse, enhances the quality of 
cooperation, and threads the social fabric together. It is a prized sentiment whose absence 
is unthinkable in many contexts, and which is sought in contexts where reason might not 
find it to be strictly necessary. When our passions for a sentiment such as this run so high, 
our instincts are probably right. We value trust instinctively because it works for us, and 
has worked for our ancestors, in ways both familiar and beyond our grasp (pp. 38-39).  
Important factors affecting trust relationships are the signifiers of trustworthiness that act 
as proxies for specific and detailed information on the trustworthiness of individuals. Among 
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these proxies are the ethnic, neighbourhood, religious and racial grouping with which one 
identifies. Many people believe they can trust those with whom they can more easily identify, 
those they think they know. This type of trust is enforced in an institutional environment where 
one has confidence that those breaking the bonds of trust will damage their reputations and result 
in legal and economic ramifications as well. 
Ponzi Schemes and the Trust Heuristic 
An enlightening example in the world of financial decision-making of the trust heuristic, 
and rational failures in the use of this heuristic, is the Bernard Madoff Ponzi scheme (LeBor 
2009). This American-based scheme, the most notorious in international financial history, had 
repercussions throughout the world. Over four decades the scheme defrauded clients of over 
US$40 billion. It was brought down in late 2008 when the global financial crisis led clients to 
attempt to cash in their assets beyond what Madoff’s fund could sustain. Madoff’s Ponzi scheme 
affected over a dozen Canadian companies and wealthy families. The Royal Bank of Canada 
reported that the exposure of some of its clients could reach $50 million. And Canada’s 
Mackenzie Financial Corporation had to halt redemptions in its Mackenzie Alternative Strategies 
once it was disclosed that about 20 per cent of its capital was invested in the Madoff Ponzi funds 
(Gray 2009). Canada has had its own share of Ponzi-type financial frauds, although nothing 
approaching the magnitude of the Madoff operation (CBC News 2009, Jones 2010, 
VanderKlippe 2009, Shecter 2010, Star Phoenix 2007). 
A Ponzi scheme pretends to provide legitimate (but high) returns on investment, whereas 
it actually provides these returns by paying out from the capital provided by new and existing 
clients. As long as there is enough new capital flowing into the Ponzi fund and there are no 
excess calls on current investments, the Ponzi scheme is sustainable, with the orchestrator of the 
scheme typically reaping significant economic returns. People invest in such schemes because 
they trust in their legitimacy, and more specifically in the legitimacy and integrity of those 
owning and managing the fund. The high rate of return promised (and delivered on occasion) is 
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also important. One has the trust heuristic in play here, plus an economic incentive. Moreover, 
investors are not always aware that government does not guarantee their investments (at least 
their initial capital), as it does certain amounts of deposits held in banks. As a result, investors 
might engage in more risky behaviour than otherwise, believing that they are shifting the risk of 
their investment to government—another moral hazard dilemma. 
Madoff was a well-established investor and player in American financial circles who had 
established a high level of trust in the international financial community. His fraudulent financial 
activities went undetected by the Securities and Exchange Commission, America’s financial 
regulatory authority, in spite of early complaints laid against him and his investment house. 
Madoff was trusted by the regulators who believed that investors were capable of self-regulation. 
The fact that he passed the regulatory test earned Madoff an additional layer of trust by investors 
and provided some objective affirmation to the intuitive and emotive drivers underlying the trust 
heuristic. By all appearances, investors behaved rationally by investing in what they trusted to be 
a relatively low-risk, stable, and safe fund, yielding somewhat higher than average returns over 
the long term. But the trust that rational investors had placed in Madoff and in America’s 
regulatory institutions was misplaced and eventually broken.  
Should prospective investors be taught not to use the trust heuristic even though it has 
being part and parcel of common and relatively successful decision-making practices for 
millennia, albeit contrary to the conventional neoclassical wisdom’s benchmarks for best-practice 
decision-making benchmarks? Would this avoid personal financial crises such as those caused by 
the Madoff Ponzi fraud? Would this keep consumers from investing in what they trusted to be 
highly-rated and relatively low risk financial paper?  
The evolution of decision making makes it doubtful that this type of financial education 
would have had any effect. However, institutional change that provides consumers with vital and 
trustful information about financial assets they might want to purchase is another matter entirely 
(Shiller 2008, 2009, 2010). So would an education providing consumers with a better 
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understanding about the risks surrounding the purchase of different classes of financial assets. 
Related to this, investment advisors and brokers can be legislated to provide an easy-to-
understand statement telling clients about the expected risks of investments and whether their 
proposed investments are underwritten by government. The latter is critically important, as it 
would clearly stipulate when individuals would have to bear the consequences of their risky 
behaviour on financial markets as opposed to transferring these costs to society at large. Finally, 
in extreme cases like that exemplified by the Madoff Ponzi scheme, regulatory frameworks need 
to be in place so that frauds can be more readily detected. As well, penalties for the architects of 
these frauds need to be severe and must be known and seen to be severe. Finally, with an 
appropriate level of financial literacy and regulation, there is a lesser probability that the bounds 
of trust would be broken, so the trust heuristic could be used in an optimal fashion. 
Conclusion: Economic Theory, Financial Literacy and Public Policy 
Different perspectives on behavioural economics yield different policy rules with regards to 
financial and financial literacy. These points are summarized in Table Two. The Kahneman-
Tversky perspective is more oriented towards policies that nudge or force individuals to change 
their behaviour in ways consistent with what experts consider to be ideal choices. Financial 
education per se is not expected to have much effect in the face of the hard-wiring of decision-
making heuristics that lead to poor financial choices. The Simon-March approach is much more 
optimistic about the impact of financial education on choice behaviour. But the availability and 
access to relevant and quality information, how information and option are framed, and the 
incentive environment within which decision making takes place are also important. 
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Table Two 
Economic Theory and Public Policy 
 Conventional Economic 
Theory 
Behavioural Economics: 
Kahneman-Tversky, Errors and 
Biases Approach 






• Education (pessimistic on 
outcomes). Individuals are 
assumed to behave in the 
ideal fashion, although 
some recognize that some 
ignorance might exist and 
be corrected for. 
• Education (pessimistic on 
outcomes). 
• Education can be used to change the 
decision-making processes and 
choices towards the conventional 
economic ideal.  
• Requires individuals overriding 
their hard-wired psychological 
dispositions.	  
• Changing defaults for investing in 
pensions.	  
• Education (optimistic on outcomes). 
• Education provides the means for 
individuals to make intelligent 
choices based on their preferences, 
incentives and the information at 
hand. 
• Changing defaults for investing in 
pensions. 
• Transparency on the risks and returns 
of default pension funds. 
• Transparency on whether there is a 




• Education (pessimistic on 
outcomes). Individuals are 
assumed to behave in the 
ideal fashion, although 
some recognize that some 
ignorance might exist and 
be corrected for. 
• Education (pessimistic on 
outcomes). 
• Education can be used to change the 
decision-making processes and 
choices towards the conventional 
economic ideal.  
• Requires individuals overriding 
their hard-wired psychological 
dispositions.	  
• Education (optimistic on outcomes). 
• Education provides the means for 
individuals to make intelligent 
choices based on their preferences, 
incentives and the information at 
hand. 
• Transparency on the risks and returns 
of default pension funds. 
• Transparency on whether there is a 
lender of last resort 




• Education (pessimistic on 
outcomes). Individuals are 
assumed to behave in the 
ideal fashion, although 
some recognize that some 
ignorance might exist and 
be corrected for. 
• Education (pessimistic on 
outcomes). 
• Education can be used to change the 
decision-making processes and 
choices towards the conventional 
economic ideal.  
• Requires individuals overriding 
their hard-wired psychological 
dispositions.	  
• Education (optimistic on outcomes). 
• Education provides the means for 
individuals to make intelligent 
choices based on their preferences, 
incentives and the information at 
hand. 
• Moral education to reduce fraud. 
• Improved transparency of financial 
transactions. 
• Well-resourced regulators to increase 
the probability of detecting financial 
fraud.  
• Severe financial penalties for those 
convicted of financial fraud so that 
marginal costs clearly outweigh 
marginal benefits. 
 
Credit cards • Education (pessimistic on 
outcomes). Individuals are 
assumed to behave in the 
ideal fashion, although 
some recognize that some 
ignorance might exist and 
be corrected for. 
• Education (pessimistic on 
outcomes). 
• Education can be used to change the 
decision-making processes and 
choices towards the conventional 
economic ideal.  
• Requires individuals overriding 
their hard-wired psychological 
dispositions.	  
• Education (optimistic on outcomes). 
• Education provides the means for 
individuals to make intelligent 
choices based on their preferences, 
incentives and the information at 
hand. 
• Reliable product labels for financial 
products. 
• Easily identifiable and understandable 
contract clauses. 
• Interest rate policy should be easily 
understood by consumer. 
• Credit card policy changes should be 
easily recognized and understand by 
customers. 
• Defaults for credit limits should be to 
the advantage of the customers. 
• Key credit card terms and conditions 
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I would argue, based on the evidence, that public policy is best constructed on the 
foundations of the Simon-March approach to behavioural economics. There is much evidence to 
support the view that financial education affects decision making. A person more educated on 
financial matters, such as concepts of risks, rates of return, credit card payments structures, and 
household budgeting, makes better decisions, at least from the perspective of the decision maker. 
Moreover, educating individuals to become more literate in numeracy should reduce errors in 
decision making. Financial education in this case is not directed towards changing human 
behaviour, such as overcoming biases as defined by the conventional wisdom. Rather it is 
directed towards helping individuals who are boundedly rational to make better decisions—
decisions informed by more specialized knowledge about financial issues, markets, and products. 
Following Shiller, one might argue that financial education should be subsidized when it has 
positive social effects, such as improving savings behaviour and reducing the chances that poor 
budgeting and investment decisions will be made. But improved decision-making requires much 
more than just improvements to financial education. 
Policy interventions directed towards improving the quality and quantity of pertinent 
information are critically important. This includes introducing quality control measures with 
regards to this information. The 2008-2009 financial crisis underscores the significance 
misleading information can have on investment behaviour. Echoing Shiller, agents and 
organizations marketing financial products, for example, should be obliged to clearly specify the 
risks and prospective returns involved in purchasing particular financial products. One might 
even go a step further and require the specification of the composition of financial products in 
terms of their components’ risks and returns (for example, whether products that on average carry 
medium risk contain components that are very high risk). This is analogous to the requirements 
for nutrition and the content requirements for food labels. It should also be made clear whether 
the consumer bears the risk of the investment—whether government guarantees the value of the 
initial investment/purchase of the financial product. If individuals believe that government bears 
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the risk, it will be rational for them to engage in riskier behaviour than they would otherwise. One 
way of partially fixing this problem is to oblige vendors of financial products to inform 
consumers/clients of the risk inherent in these products and even to require both parties to sign a 
document specifying that the conditions of risks are understood. 
It is also important to introduce baseline rules to assure that information is framed and 
presented in a manner easily understood by the consumer. For example, it should be made clear 
and easily evident what the penalties are for late payments on credit cards, what the longer term 
rate of interest is, and whether the default for the card is to approve purchases even if they extend 
the cardholder beyond the contractually agreed credit limit. Another example relates to pension 
plans. Many behavioural economists recommend making investing in pension plans managed by 
the private sector the default option to induce increased savings for retirement. Once investing in 
pensions becomes the default, employees tend to invest, using the default as a signal that such an 
investment is a good and safe one. For this reason, those setting the default should be obliged to 
specify the risks and prospective returns of such investments. 
Once it is recognized that baseline rules for product information ought to be required, it 
becomes critical to define the level of financial literacy needed by the representative consumer 
and decision maker for whom these rules are constructed. Should the government consider the 
representative consumer to be an individual who is highly literate, or one who is just barely 
literate? I would argue that the representative consumer should be thought of as at the lower end 
of the scale since even the least financially literate individuals should be able to understand the 
financial information before them. It is these people who tend to make the most errors in financial 
decision-making. Increasing their level of financial literacy would provide these decision makers 
with the means with which to make the best use of the information at hand. 
Finally, the Simon-March approach suggests that there is a need for interventions in the 
marketplace that will re-orient the incentive environment to ensure that individual investors bear 
the risks of their decisions. This is particularly important for key decision-makers in financial 
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institutions. I do not mean to suggest that people should or can be educated not to value their own 
material well-being. Rather, investors can be obliged to consider the riskiness of their choices and 
not allowed to shift their risk onto other unsuspecting people. This would require government to 
intervene in setting up the structure of compensation packages for decision makers in financial 
institutions, a move which may be problematic for many policymakers. But given the importance 
of the financial sector and the possible repercussions of a failure in this sector for the economy at 
large—namely forced government bailouts (which transfers all risks to the government and thus 
to the general public)—the sensible alternative may be to impose minimal regulations that 
minimize the possibility that investors will make choices that are deemed to be too risky. Such 
policy has been most recently recommended, for example, by Posner (2009) and Roubini and 
Mihm (2010). As well, moral education is important for financial transactions insofar as there is a 
need to reduce the probability of fraudulent transactions.  
Behavioural economics also suggests that various types of experiments and surveys can 
be conducted to determine how consumers would behave under different sets of informational, 
educational (financial literacy), and institutional settings. One could also determine in this 
fashion differential behaviour among gender, ethnic and immigrant groups across Canada, and 
ascertain where financial education would have the greatest marginal effects. One example of this 
would be to run experiments on how decision making is affected by the structure of the 
information provided. Variables should include complexity, location of key information, and font 
size. Another example would be to see how decision making is affected by altering the moral 
hazard environment for people at different levels of financial literacy. It would be equally 
important to clarify the relative role of defaults, information, clarity of information, and 
incentives in affected financial decision making. One might also examine the extent to which 
formal financial education instruments improve the quality of financial decision-making when 
information is misleading, overly complex or hidden, or when defaults are set contrary to the 
preferences of consumers. 
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Overall, behavioural economics open the door to the improvement of decision making 
through financial education. They also lend support to the possibility that other public policy 
initiatives can enhance financial literacy and thereby improve the quality of financial decision-
making without additional investment in traditional learning environments. The bounded 
rationality approach pays particular attention to how smart but non-neoclassical decision-makers 
are influenced by information and the incentive environment. Formal financial education courses 
and seminars are not as important here as are quantity, quality, and structure of information and 
its availability at low cost, as well as institutional parameters that affect financial decision-
making. More formal education instruments are important with regards to enhancing the capacity 
of individuals to process and understand the information at hand. It is these factors combined, and 
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